The Internet & State Political Party Organizations

Kristyn L. Miller

Senior Thesis
Adviser: Stephen K. Medvic
Department of Government
Franklin & Marshall College

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In Memory of

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PART ONE:
BACKGROUND
CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

--- Models of Party Organization ---

Political parties have a long history in the United States and around the world. With no shortage of scholarly work examining the topic, understanding how parties work has clearly been a goal for generations. Models of party organization have varied widely and tended to adapt with each generation. In what is now a classic work, Michels (1911) was one of the first to attempt to explain how political parties survive. His “iron law of oligarchy,” whereby every political party that is not oligarchical at birth would inevitably lean toward such tendencies, marked one of the earliest attempts at modeling political party behavior. Later dubbed the cadre party, these elitist organizations were dominant in the 19th century and were viewed not as true links between citizens and government but, rather, as a form of “trustee” government (Katz & Mair, 1995). In other words, “parties were basically committees of those people who jointly constituted both the state and civil society” (Katz & Mair, 1995, 9). Moreover, it was during this time period that politics was characterized by the assumption that there was a single national interest and it was the role of the government to discover and enact this interest. With this, the political parties that existed were predominantly groups of men seeking the public interest, which in many cases, actually turned out to be private interests (Katz & Mair, 1995).

It wasn't until the mid-twentieth century that new models of party organization rapidly developed. Originally described by Duverger (1954), the mass party highlighted the transformations taking place in society at the time. As the population grew and new masses of
working class voters dominated politics, parties were forced to change. Social groups became a key player in politics and parties began to represent these groups, serving as a direct linkage between citizens and government. The mass party was most evident from 1880-1960 and allowed parties to function as “delegates” for the citizens. In other words, “the classic mass party is a party of civil society, emanating from sectors of the electorate, with the intention of breaking into the state and modifying public policy in the long-term interests of the constituency to which it is accountable” (Katz & Mair, 1995, 8).

Soon, however, a new model of party organization developed. The end of World War II brought less emphasis on class, as radical ideology fell out of favor with the public. The catch-all party started as early as the mid-twentieth century and continues today (Katz & Mair, 1995). Avoiding the pre-determined social groups that were crucial to the mass party, under the catch-all model, leadership choice defined political life and the link between citizens and government became a less important role for political parties (Kirchheimer, 1966). Katz & Mair (1995) have dubbed this model the “entrepreneur”; in their words, the catch-all party stood between civil society and the state, seeking “temporary custody of public policy in order to satisfy the short-term demands of its pragmatic consumers”(8). The last widely recognized model of party organization arose with the growth of state subvention and the development of capital. In this model, political parties have privileged access to the government and their organization is less hierarchical internally (Katz & Mair, 1995). This cartel party, also called “agent of the state,” was first recognized as beginning in the 1970s and, it too, continues today (Katz & Mair, 1995). With this model, the state is “invaded by the parties” and these parties determine the rules. Thus, the state “becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders”(Katz & Mair, 1995, 16).
Important to all of these models of party organization are the links among civil society, party, and state. Katz & Mair (1995) argue that the evolution of these connections can be simplified into stages, largely driven by external stimuli and responses (See Table 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite / Cadre Party</th>
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--- Party Change ---

The topic of party change is closely linked to the development of models of party organization. Generally, the catalysts for party change are widespread and can be either internal, external, or a combination of the two. Initially, dramatic external changes were understood as crucial to party change, as can be seen in the transformation of party models as a reaction to environmental events (Duverger, 1954; Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995; Panebianco,
Panebianco (1988) describes social stratification and technology as two major environmental factors that influence change.

The dominant conclusion for most scholars, however, is that both internal and external events are sources of change (Panebianco, 1988; Wilson, 1980; Muller, 1997; Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Katz, 2002). Theories regarding the most influential source of party change vary from poor electoral performance (Janda, 1980) to party leadership (Wilson, 1980; Muller, 1997; Harmel et al., 1995, Appleton & Ward, 1994). Harmel et al. (1995) contend that poor electoral performance is neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining party change. Instead, party actors explain some of the difference; moreover, they recognize that discrete change is influenced by both internal and external factors that can work independently or dynamically to produce transformation. The natural tendency of organizations is to resist change internally and thus, transformation occurs only when the survival of the organization is threatened (Freeman, 1986). While the most widely held conclusion is that both external and internal stimuli can influence party change in various ways, the direction and degree of change that is stimulated by various events, whether an electoral loss, leadership change or environmental stimuli, is still debated (Harmel & Tan, 2003; Panebianco, 1988; Katz & Mair, 1994, 2002; Harmel et al., 1995; Janda et al., 1995; Harmel, 2002).

Harmel (2002) identifies three general literatures on party change, all of which recognize both internal and external reasons for parties to both change and resist change. The first, described as natural growth and maturation, he calls the "life cycle" approach and identifies it with Michels (1911). This theory, according to Harmel (2002) is best at explaining fundamental changes within the party concerning leadership roles and the parts of the party organization.

The second literature emphasizes environmental trends as the most important influence in party
change. Recognized as “system-level trends,” this outlook emphasizes organizational form changes, as is evident in the previous discussion of models of party organization. The shift from cadre to mass to catch-all and cartel parties represents change as a reaction to environmental trends and it is most evident in the works of Duverger (1951), Kirchheimer (1966), Panebianco (1988), and Katz & Mair (1995). Harmel (2002) suggests that the third literature on party change emphasizes discrete change as a reaction to either an environmental (external) event or and internal influence. In this approach, discrete changes in the environment surrounding a party or factors coming from within the party may result in abrupt transformations in the party’s organization (Harmel, 2002). These changes, unlike the clustered changes from the previous approaches, tend to be disconnected from others. Works in this camp include Wilson (1980), Muller (1997), Harmel & Janda (1994), and Harmel *et al.* (1995). While each of these models differs sharply from the others, it is often assumed that in reality, political parties have elements of more than one type of party organization. “Regardless of party traditions, parties adopt elements from the ‘mass party,’ the ‘catch-all’ party or the ‘cartel’ party models in accordance with the external forces defining their operative surroundings” (Heidar & Sagie, 2003).

--- The Network Model ---

Recent work geared to understanding and developing theories of party organization have not led to any significant consensus regarding current political party organizations. Theories range widely with some scholars emphasizing the role political parties play to voters while others focus on the internal workings of the organizations. Snyder & Ting (2002) suggest that political parties are informative “brands” to voters, parties thus serve to aggregate ideologically similar candidates, signaling their policy preferences.

On the other hand, theories emphasizing the networking qualities of political parties have
developed rapidly in the past decade. Podolny & Page (1998) maintain that network organizations have blossomed in recent years and organizations no longer tend to conform to the traditional definitions of markets or hierarchies. They define a network form of organization as “any collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny & Page, 1998, 59). In such organizations, a norm of reciprocity between participants exists and a sense of obligation between parties, rather than a desire to take advantage of any established trust, underlies business workings. The functions of a network organization, as opposed to a more hierarchical organization, include learning, providing legitimacy and status to participants, and economic benefits (Podolny & Page, 1998).

In describing U.S. political parties as network organizations, Bibby (1999) suggests that in recent years there has been

...heightened national-state party integration that has resulted in state parties becoming an integral element in the implementation of national campaign strategies, an expanded role for party-allied organizations that work closely with the parties in achieving mutual electoral goals, [and] the development of party organizations as networks of issue-oriented activists. (70)

For instance, Bibby cites the example of an interest group that has become so intertwined in party activities that it “...has taken over such traditional functions as voter mobilization and campaign advertising...” (1999, 76). In such a case, the interest group cannot be considered “outside the party structure”; he concludes, “Party organization, can therefore, be likened to a network that includes regular party organizations as well as allied organizations, candidates’ personal organizations, and individuals working to win elections” (Bibby, 1999, 76). With a number of examples of interconnection based on direct and indirect funding, strategy sessions, and shared information, Bibby goes beyond allied groups to consider think-tanks, PACs, and
consultants as parts of the party network (1999). “Campaign consultants have also become an integral part of the parties’ organizational networks. A substantial proportion (41 percent in a recent survey by Logan and Kolodny [1997]) of consultants serve an apprenticeship within party organizations before moving into the private sector” (Bibby, 1999, 80).

Another theory of network organization describes it as “...a mixture of ‘cadre’ and ‘mass’ elements” (Heidar & Saglie, 2003). In their study of Norwegian political parties, Heidar & Saglie (2003) conclude that the Internet has brought transformation in the internal communication of parties, but the organizations remain stable with ‘mass’ party structures despite a few network-like alternatives that have emerged. Carty (2004) combines the network model with a franchise outlook emphasizing a “brand name,” as Snyder & Ting (2002) had previously. The focus of this model is on the stratarchical internal organization of the party, rather than the hierarchical nature that has been most commonly examined. With increased reliance on outside professionals, Carty recognizes that declining party identification, combined with increasing numbers of opportunistic electoral appeals by parties, has added up to “a general portrait of political parties that are more leader-driven yet internally democratic, and which now have to compete in a more open electoral market but with a less defined or stable support base” (2004, 6).

Upon examination, classic conceptions of political parties, from the cadre party to the catch-all to the mass party all reveal an implicit assumption that “...the contest for organizational power is a zero-sum game in which power held by leaders or activists or members must come at the expense of the others” (Carty, 2004, 6). Carty believes this is flawed logic and that “...organizational units within parties can possess a significant degree of autonomy” because of the tendency for relationships to be more stratarchical than hierarchical (2004, 7). “In a
stratarchical party, organizational power and authority does not finally rest in any single place, or with any single set of individuals - it is (more or less) broadly shared; moreover, mutual autonomy remains a key feature to “understanding and reconciling the apparent contradictions implicit in the changing patterns of party life” while also recognizing the “internal dynamics of these parties” (Carty, 2004, 9). According to his research, the franchise model allows for such mutual autonomy by organizing around a central committee, which controls brand name, sets standards, defines markets, or in the case of parties, membership bases, and supplies local organizations, who work to deliver the product.

--- Political Culture ---

Understanding the political culture of an organization is instrumental to understanding the behavior of that organization. As Jo Freeman (1986) argues, there is a “fundamental difference between the national Democratic and Republican parties” and, moreover, this difference is seen with regard to how internal politics is conducted, “The difference is not one of purpose, but of political culture” (Freeman, 1986, 327). Does this difference, however, extend to state party organizations? And if so, do these cultural differences dictate how state parties use the Internet? Party culture at the national level, while not exactly indicative of politics at the state level, is a necessary framework for understanding state party culture.

With regard to the Democratic and Republican parties, Freeman contends that there are essentially two differences between the parties, in which all other differences are rooted. She suggests,

The first one is structural: in the Democratic party power flows upward and in the Republican party power flows downward. The second is attitudinal: Republican perceive themselves as insiders even when they are out of power, and Democrats perceive themselves as outsiders even when they are in power. (Freeman, 1986, 328)
These differences lead to discrepancies in organizational style, which I believe will have particular relevance to how each state party uses the Internet. Although it is obvious that all state political parties share the ultimate goal of winning elections, and furthermore, that there exists a number of superficial similarities in the structure of party organizations across the country, these likenesses do not translate into similarities in organizational style. Specifically, Freeman notes, “Like corporations, or well-established interest groups, Republican party organizations rely heavily on money and professional expertise. Like social movements and volunteer organizations, Democratic party organizations rely more on donations of time and commitment” (1986, 343).

The rise of the Internet in politics complicates these characterizations of party culture. Relevant decades ago, do these norms still hold true today? Take for example Freeman’s characterization of impersonal recruitment, typically a Republican activity. She argues that impersonal recruitment is the most effective “when what is wanted is not actual participation but superficial indexes of support such as money and voting” (355). The Internet is clearly a form of impersonal recruitment and a tactic that both parties have adopted in recruitment. To which party has the Internet become more important for recruitment or fundraising? Freeman’s understanding leads to the hypothesis that the Republican party will value the Internet more highly as a tool in both cases.

Philip Klinkner echoes Freeman’s assertions regarding the culture of both the Democratic and Republican parties. He suggests that at the national level, the Republicans “focus on the technical and managerial aspects of party activities, ‘nuts and bolts’ and ‘business values’” (Klinkner, 1994a, 278). The Democrats emphasize “party procedures” and are more
inclined to consider “inclusion and representation within the party” when making decisions (278). Klinkner has argued elsewhere (1994b) that party culture nearly dictates the response of out-party national committees to electoral losses with Republicans relying on organizational transformations and the Democrats consistently utilizing procedural reforms. “While culture is not determinative, it does provide an important and often significant element in the behavior of party organizations” (Klinkner, 1994a, 287).

Further research on party culture has lead Klinkner (1994a) to contend, “...much of the Democratic Party’s focus on procedural matters stems, in large part, from a party culture that stresses inclusion and participation, while the Republican Party's emphasis on organizational and managerial activities arises from a party culture that values the techniques and technology of business enterprises” (275). Klinkner explains,

An organization’s culture represents the composite of several factors: the societal culture in which the organization resides, the nature of the organization’s business and its business environment, the social and professional background of the organization’s members, the impact of the important leaders, particularly those who help found the organization, and the historical memory of important or crisis events, among others. (1994a, 277)

Moreover, “While often strong and stable, organizational cultures are not static; they can and do evolve over time”; particularly, the influence of such triggers as a changing external environment, strong leaders, or societal transformations, tend to play a role in the evolution of an organization’s culture (Klinkner, 1994a, 277).

--- Political Parties & The Electorate ---

Political parties have declined in the minds of citizens over the past 40 years (Clarke & Stewart, 1998). This decline can be seen in decreased percentages of strong party identifiers, increased percentages of independents and non-identifiers, and increased individual-level
instability in party identification. As Clarke & Stewart (1998) suggest, partisan attachments in the United States have eroded since the late 1960s, with events such as the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and Watergate, but these attachments have not been completely abandoned. Essentially, the debate over party decline among political party scholars was at its peak in the late-twentieth century. Hinging on arguments that party decline was either a reality in Western democracies or a misnomer based on invalid statistics, a large number of scholars took the side of decline as a reality (Mair, 1993; Coleman, 1996; Katz & Mair, 1995; Janda, 1980; Bibby, 1999, Cotter & Hennessey, 1964, Gibson et al., 1983). John F. Bibby characterized it by stating, "The predominant organizational characteristics of American parties during the postwar period were decentralization and organizational weakness at both the national and state levels" (1999, 70).

"Whether it is 'realignment,' 'dealignment,' 'decomposition,' 'decline,' or 'demise,' or some combination of these, there can be little doubt that political parties in the United States are in ferment" (Gibson et al., 1983, 193).

Nonetheless, the debate over party decline or resurgence has lead to the recent conclusion that parties have become revitalized overall. According to Mair (1993) electoral change in Europe, and in particular, the decline of parties and/or dealignment & realignment, are myths. Instead, European electorates are stable and enduring with alignments that are frozen, and lastly, with parties that remain old, perhaps even out-dated, yet surviving. He argues that the tendency to equate social change with political change is misguided. Moreover, the lack of up-to-date research on political parties as organizations has caused a lack of understanding. Early research focused on parties as organizations, and moreover, "...as the essential political linkage between citizens and the state";

Since the end of the 1960s, however, attention has focused more on citizens
themselves and their responses to parties – in the form of the vast literature on individual electoral behaviour; and on the parties as teams of leaders or as governors – in the form of the vast literature on coalitions and policy formation. And thus what came in between these two, the party as an organization, was ignored. (Mair, 1993, 131)

According to Coleman (1996), “Where fifteen years ago there was consensus that party organizations were weak, today the consensus argues the party organizations are revitalized, resurgent, and relevant” (368). However, he contends that the consensus of party resurgence results from studying what parties do, thus making them appear busy, rather than studying their impact. Differing from most scholars, he states, “A party organization and party system that I would label ‘resurgent’ or ‘revitalized’ would not be one that witnesses sustained declining participation or one with participation levels as low as at present” (Coleman, 1996, 374).

Moreover, Coleman cites the well-documented Republican advantages in party organization, as support for his claim that parties are not resurgent. According to his research, the apparent strengths of Republican state and local parties over Democratic parties have not demonstrated a payoff that is in line with the success that should be a product of their situation. Consequently, what appears to be organizational strength may in actuality, merely represent activity levels.

--- State Level Organizational Strength ---

State party organizations were traditionally very weak and apt to factional conflict, as they began as “loose federations of semi-independent local party chairmen” (Hershey & Beck, 2003). Described as “empty shells” in the 1940’s and 1950’s, a number of scholars have recognized their continual growth and strengthening since the 1960’s (Hershey & Beck, 2003; Gibson et al., 1983; Aldrich, 2000; Bibby, 1990; Eldersveld & Walton, 2000).

The major conclusion of much of the work on state organizations is that there has long been a Republican advantage in strength at the state level that has continued to hold true in
recent years (Hershey & Beck, 2003; Jewell & Morehouse, 2001; Aldrich, 2000; Freeman, 1986; Gibson et al., 1983; Bibby, 1990). "Generally, Democratic state party organizations are substantially weaker than their Republican counterparts. The disparity in Republican and Democratic strength does not vary by region, reflecting uniform Republican dominance" (Gibson et al., 1983, 206). Thus, Republican state parties tend to have bigger budgets, more staff, and to be more organized than Democratic state organizations.

With research that has tended to rely heavily on case studies, generalization regarding state organizational behavior has been risky. Thus, the study by Gibson et al. (1983) marks one of the first widespread empirical studies of state organizations. Using the organizing principle of state organizational strength, as measured through both organizational structure (regularized procedures, division of labor, bureaucratization) and programmatic activity, Gibson and his colleagues analyzed state organizations across the nation. "Organizationally strong parties are parties that have an enduring headquarters operation and engage in a variety of activities related to electoral goals. More conceptually, strong parties require both organizational complexity and programmatic capacity" (Gibson et al., 1983, 198). Their research suggests that, "...party organizational strength is not determined by levels of party identification. Party organizations seem to have been resistant to the variety of dealigning forces that have shaped the electoral universe and that have been presumed to have threatened American parties" (Gibson et al., 1983, 215). Moreover, the resilience of state party organizations is strong; adaptation to departisanization of the electorate, the threat of extraparty organizations, and influences that appear to weaken party organizations, has proven that state party organizations are stable and lasting (Gibson et al., 1983).

Falling in line with the work of Gibson and his colleagues, Freeman characterizes
political culture at the state level by suggesting,

The greater financial resources of the Republican party are somewhat illusory, though their greater centralization is not. The party organizations outspend their Democratic rivals, but Democratic candidates often have more money than Republican ones. The evidence is that Democrats are more likely to donate money to candidates than to the party... (1986, 344)

At the time of her work, this trend continued to hold true at the state level with evidence that Republican money was often raised centrally and passed down, whereas Democratic money tended to be raised locally and spent locally (Freeman, 1986). However, this aspect of state culture may have changed with recent moves toward centralization of fundraising by the Democratic National Committee.

In characterizing the state organizations of both parties, Freeman suggests that the Republican Party, as of the mid-1980’s, built up state parties in an attempt to solidify loyalty whereas the Democrats faced a “collection of independent and diverse entities” (1986, 353). Freeman goes on to interpret the professionalism of each party at the state level, maintaining that the Republican Party has more central control than the Democratic Party. This is evidenced in the Republican Party where a “community of professional political managers who rotate among state party staff positions, national party staff positions, campaigns, and other political jobs” exists. Having developed “a loyalty to the national Republican Party greater than to any state organization,” members of this community who are in state staff jobs are naturally “more amenable to national party direction... [as] the state staffs in effect become agents of the national party” (1986, 354). In the Democratic Party, “Each state has its own cadre of political activists, and there is very little exchange between them except during presidential campaigns, which are separate from party work” and this leads to an environment in which “staffs are the agents of their employers and not the national party” (1986, 354).
In a more recent study of state parties, Jewell & Morehouse (2001) cite the work of Aldrich (2000) as demonstrating that state party organizations are continuing to grow and strengthen. Furthermore, Jewell & Morehouse (2001) maintain that Republican organizations remain stronger, more professional, and better funded than Democratic organizations. While the structure of each organization is similar across all 100 state organizations, with a state chair and executive director at a minimum, much of the similarity ends there.

The formal structure of state political parties resembles a layer cake more than a pyramid. The latter evokes the imagery of hierarchy and command, while the former, more the notion of strata and autonomy...there is no command structure within political parties. Rather, each geographic unit of the party tends to be autonomous from both those above it and those below it. Each unit is likewise autonomous from the other units at its same geographic level. Not only is the party structured in horizontal layers (Key, 1964: 316), it is structured (and thus divided) vertically as well. That is, at each geographic level, the party is likely to have a convention, a committee, and a set of officers and chairman. (Jewell & Olson, 1978)

"It has been said that the United States has one hundred different state party systems...State organizations live in different social and political environments and thus seem to develop differently" (Eldersveld & Walton, 2000, 129). Regardless of the many differences in organization, it is widely accepted that state parties, on the whole, are not declining, but adapting to society and technology (Jewell & Morehouse, 2001).

--- State Party Relationship With The National Organization ---

Bibby (1999) claims that coordinated activity between the national and state parties are commonplace in the current political atmosphere. He notes, "National-state party integration is mutually beneficial. The national party is able to skirt campaign finance laws by utilizing its state affiliates for 'party building' while the state parties gain more professional staffing, high-tech equipment, and expanded and updated voter lists" (Bibby, 1999, 75). The down side, however, for state organizations is a loss of autonomy as they become increasingly dependent upon the
national organization. Before the 1970s, state organizations were disconnected and fragmented in comparison to the national parties. Uniformities that began to be introduced in the 1970s led to greater integration. For example, stipulations arose that mandated that all state parties must select the party personnel that are within their formal structure in an election year (Jewell & Olson, 1978). Consequently, the highly decentralized party system that once existed has diminished, as national organizations now define and enforce an increasing number of standards (Bibby, 1990).

"The most important ingredient in strengthening the state party organizations, though, has been the national parties' party-building efforts" (Hershey & Beck, 2003, 66). With almost $250 million dollars transferred to the state party organizations in the 1999-2000 election cycle ($129 million from the RNC and $114.6 million from the DNC), it is clear that the national organizations have taken notice of the importance of their state level counterparts (Hershey & Beck, 2003). With Howard Dean at the head of the DNC, a new 50 State Strategy geared at organizing and funding Democratic activists in all 50 states may help close the gap on the Republican organizational dominance.

"One of the most significant questions concerning the future of state parties is the nature of their relationship to increasingly strong national party organizations" (Bibby, 2002). Given the transformation of state parties in the past twenty years, it is clear, with a record of "adaptability and durability" that has been called "impressive", that the resiliency of state organizations is unquestionable (Bibby, 1990).
CHAPTER TWO

THE INTERNET AND POLITICS

-- Revolutionary? The Internet in Comparison to Other Communications Technology --

In the case of the Internet, as in the case of many past communications Technologies, both predictions and interpretations of impact tend to be radical. Recently, it has been suggested that, “the Internet has reached into – and, in some cases, reshaped- just about every important realm of modern life” (PEW, 2005, 57). Joe Trippi, campaign manager for Vermont Governor Howard Dean’s 2004 Democratic presidential candidacy, has been at forefront of discussions regarding the revolutionary aspects of the Internet. He states,

It took the telephone sixty-seven years to go from 1 percent of households to 75 percent. Took the car fifty-two years. The radio fourteen. The fastest innovation to get into 75 percent of households was the television, which took seven years. And that’s about how long it took 75 percent of Americans to get on the Internet. Seven years... [He goes on,] From here, the world changes faster than you can imagine. This is where it gets good, where it gets thrilling, frightening, inevitable. Best of all, this is a fresh start. We get another shot at this. It’s 1956 again and we just got the box in the house. We are in the same stage of the Internet revolution that the television was at in 1956, when the percentage of homes with a TV passed 75 percent. (Trippi, 2004, 54 & 201)

In highlighting the progression of communications technology from newspapers to the Internet, Davis (1999) notes how each new technology was accompanied by high expectations for beneficial influences on politics. Newspapers in the early 1600s were expected to transform society by bringing a new equality to men whereas the invention of the telegraph brought predictions of nations that would become increasingly united. The twentieth century in particular, has been at the center of the communications revolution, with technology from the
wireless radio, to television, and now, the Internet. Davis contends,

In each case, the new media were viewed as upsetting the old order and establishing a new one based on the traits of the new technology... Yet that is not what really happened. Existing media did not fold in response. Power structures did not crumble. The public did not rise up and become suddenly powerful players vis-a-vis media or government. Instead, the reaction was quite different. At each innovation in the history of mass communications, existing media and other actors adapted to the new technologies and incorporated them. Rather than losing power, they retained it. (1999, 29)

Thus, when radio emerged, existing players, such as newspapers, interest groups, business, and government, all took over the tool. Similarly, television also became dominated by the typical media players during its early stages. Thus, the Internet, despite its ability to delineate the various types of mass media by integrating text, audio, and visual presentations in an interactive mass transmission and reception, is also destined to fall short of revolutionary expectations and to serve as a means for existing players to continue to dominate mass communication (Davis, 1999).

Media usage patterns convey mixed messages regarding the impact of the Internet. According to a recent survey, newspapers, radio, and the Internet remain secondary sources of campaign news, as is evident by results that indicated that approximately three-quarters of Americans who use the Internet (76%) cite television as their primary or secondary source for news regarding the Presidential campaign (Kohut, 2003).

--- The Internet, Participation, and Democracy ---

As with most topics related to the Internet, predictions for political participation vary widely. What's more, research on the topic has only produced what can be considered a mild consensus on exactly what impact the Internet has had thus far, and moreover, what impact it is likely to have on participation in the future. Generally, it has been accepted that the Internet will follow the pattern of traditional media outlets with participation remaining similar to those stable levels that have existed for so long (Krueger, 2002; Bimber, 2001, 2003; Neuman, 1996; Ward et
The scenario of an active, informed electorate gathering information and expressing opinions electronically is accurate for some individuals - those who are already politically interested and motivated. For that group, the Internet will be a tremendous boon in the process of collecting information, interacting with policy makers, and, indeed, shaping policy. But for the majority who are less politically interested, this scenario is unreal. These people will not be more likely, just because of a technological innovation, to suddenly acquire an interest in politics and follow the above scenario. (Davis, 1999, 23)

Some scholars have expressed concern over the Internet's impact on political knowledge, and specifically, the case at which the Internet allows users to draw in and/or filter out news at will, thus serving merely to reinforce existing attitudes (Neuman, 1996). Others, however, have taken an opposing stance, arguing that the Internet will actually broaden an individual's political knowledge by serving as an interactive forum for communication from all sources (Horrigan et al., 2004). Based on research by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, Horrigan et al. (2004) contend that the Internet does not stifle healthy democratic deliberation by serving only to reinforce existing political preferences. Instead, Internet users demonstrated a wider awareness of political views during the 2004 election, reflecting a higher level of interest in politics among Internet users, as has been depicted previously (Horrigan et al., 2004). Naturally, this lead me to question the results, as it seems likely that Internet users are not representative of the general population and tend to be of higher income, education and socioeconomic status. The survey, however, found that this increased awareness of political views was upheld across political interest levels and demographic characteristics. Thus, selective exposure was less evident among Internet users and, when controlled for other factors, Internet use alone remained an influence on a person's exposure to political arguments (Horrigan et al., 2004).

Predictions of the revolutionary impact of the Internet on democracy are again
widespread. “The Internet is the most democratizing innovation we’ve ever seen – more so than even the printing press. There has never been a technology this fast, this expansive, with the ability to connect this many people from around the world” (Trippi, 2004, 235). Moreover, some argue that the Internet enhances democracy. Although once a convenience, is the Internet a necessity in politics? The answer to this question remains to be seen. The democratic nature of the Internet is a topic that is difficult to study. Countries that have the most widespread Internet use tend to be well-established democracies. Moreover, debates regarding the role of the media, and thus, communications technology, in a democracy are ongoing. Despite the belief that democracy requires active citizens and a news media that supplies them with information that is needed to participate in politics, Doris Graber (2003) contends that “Neither citizens nor media are capable of performing the roles expected of them”(139). Moreover, democracy can and has persisted despite the fact that both the media and citizens fall short of expectations. The Internet as a media outlet “cannot overcome the main physical and physiological barriers to participatory citizenship” (Graber, 2003, 152; Norris, 2001; Bimber, 2003). In comparison to traditional media outlets, the Internet puts forth information from a wider array of sources that include far more varied viewpoints.

The Internet comes closer to being a ‘common carrier’ open to the messages of all who desire to speak than any previous technology...Since people’s interests vary, the notion that one type of news coverage can serve all needs is naïve. Diverse audiences are better served when the rich diet of news available on the Internet covers a broad array of topics, framed in multiple ways, and presented at various levels of sophistication. (Graber, 2003, 152)

Nonetheless, the Internet has its flaws. Primarily, the potential of the Internet in politics is far from fulfilled as the technology tends to be used for entertainment or business far more than as a political asset (Graber, 2003). Moreover, “The societal segments who already are immersed
in valuable information – the well-educated and economically secure – dominate Internet use. In that sense, the Internet contributes to inequality of opportunity rather than diminishing it (Graber, 2003, 153). Until this digital divide, as it's been dubbed, has been bridged, can the Internet truly be called revolutionary to democracy? As one scholar put it, “Patterns of Internet political participation will merely imitate the established patterns of participatory inequality in the United States. Because those from advantaged backgrounds access the medium at higher rates, the opportunities to participate via the Internet should disproportionately extend to high-resource individuals” (Kreuger, 2002, 476). Norris (2001) suggests that there are three types of digital divides. The “global divide” refers to the varying degrees of access between industrialized and developing nations; the “social divide” is the gap that exists within each nation regarding the information rich and poor; lastly, the “democratic divide” encompasses the differences between those who do and do not use digital technology to engage and participate in political life (Norris, 2001, 4). The disparities that have risen out of the new technology affect not only United States politics, but politics around the world.

--- The Internet & Campaigning ---

“The Internet was a key force in politics last year as 75 million Americans used it to get news, discuss candidates in emails, and participate directly in the political process” (Rainie et al., 2005, 1). Perhaps the most influential role of the Internet has been on campaigning. Rommele (2003) recognizes three eras in campaigning, each reflecting a different style: 1) face to face communication, 2) “modern era” - impersonal channels of communication, such as mass media and TV develop, 3) Americanized or postmodern campaigning - business approach to campaigning that utilizes the Internet, direct mail, and various communication tools, such as opinion polls and focus groups, in order to shift power outward and upward to the media and
political leaders. Merelman (2000) suggests that the technology of modernism, which lasted into the 1960s, educated citizens to manipulate machines and control nature. The era of postmodern technology emphasizes the self and transforms how we conceptualize problems. Citing two examples that are symbolic of each era, Merelman (2000) maintains that both of these periods are reflected in politics. The era of modernism allowed liberal democracy to flourish and industrial productivity to increase, while reflecting an attitude that emphasizes human manipulation of the environment; this can most readily be seen in the establishment of the NSF (National Science Foundation) in 1950. What’s more, in the postmodern era, research directed at human beings has grown exponentially; less emphasis has been placed on human manipulation of the environment and nature, and more work has been geared at comprehending the self, as is symbolized in the Human Genome Project of the 1990’s (Merelman, 2000).

This transformation in campaigning style has been noted by other academics as well. “Within the past decade, campaign styles and practices have changed dramatically worldwide ushering in a new era of professional or Americanised campaigning (Gibson & Rommele, 2005). This new approach to campaigning is best highlighted by a “more direct, stylized and personalized mode of campaigning...that seeks to flesh out voters’ interests and mould its policies to suit” and “While these changes were in motion before the rise of the Internet as a mass medium,” it is nonetheless well suited to promoting this new approach (Gibson & Rommele, 2005, 280). The inherent properties of the Internet, such as bandwidth, individualization, and interactivity, both facilitate and hinder the spread of professionalized campaign techniques (Gibson et al., 2003). The three main potential impacts of the Internet on campaigning and politics generally are,

First, the high volume and spread of transmission could provide a more substantive basis
for campaigning than other forms of media, reducing the 'soundbite' element that is seen as having crept into political discourse with the rise of TV. Second, the individualization of the medium in terms of user control means that it becomes possible for organizations to identify and target voters and personalize messages with direct email. Finally, the interactive potential of the technology allows parties to offer new fora for member and voter participation in the shape of chat-rooms or intranets. Alternatively, parties could take a more superficial approach and utilize the two-way communications possibilities to gather immediate feedback on their policies. (Gibson et al., 2003, 49).

By providing actors with "significant control over the content and 'dosage' of information, the Internet "offers a new and more immediate channel for feedback" with the possibility of "continuous and even 'real-time' moulding of the message by political operatives to meet market demands." (Gibson & Rommele, 2005, 280). At a local level, Gibson & Rommele suggest that the cheap cost and high capacity to generate money quickly will turn the Internet, and website creation, into something that marks the first step of local campaigns into the "high-tech" era (2005).

Researchers have recognized that the Internet, as a tool for participation, is most inextricably linked to donating money (Bimber, 2001). "With the growing power and acceptance of the Internet, online fundraising is establishing itself as one of the most important and effective fundraising methods available" (Richardson, 2000). "Instead of relying on the grace and favour of newspaper editors and expensive mass mail-outs, parties and their nominees can now send their message, direct and undiluted to the converted, as well as the uncommitted, across a wide geographic terrain" (Gibson & Rommele, 2005, 273). Moreover, traditional fundraising is expensive, ranging from $0.70 per dollar raised for a phone bank solicitation to $0.30 per dollar raised for event fundraising. Thus, the Internet is a far more cost-effective means of raising money. Contributions given via the Internet have been shown to be larger than average, typically ranging from $120–$220, in comparison to traditional donations which range on average from
Gibson & Rommele (2005) suggest that, "most minor and almost all major political actors have been using a range of new ICTs [information and communications technologies] for much of the last decade" (275). American examples of Internet success began well before Howard Dean in 2004. Jessie Ventura is one example of a “Web-catapulted” candidate with his 1998 surprise victory in the Minnesota gubernatorial election. John McCain followed in his footsteps by using Ventura's Internet manager in his bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000. Consequently, rather than concluding that the "David and Goliath" examples are exceptions to the rule, Gibson and Rommele have concluded that "by 2003 web campaigning had become the norm in the US, Germany, and Finland- at least among major party candidates- where 'norm' here means that candidates were more likely than not to have a website" (2005, 278).

--- Party Organizations & the Internet: Party Websites ---

With the rise of the Internet a new threat to political parties emerged. Could parties be supplanted by direct democracy? Some scholars suggested that the Internet was either a "saviour or executioner" of political parties (Gibson et al., 2003). Goodhart (1999) suggests that the threat to parties was overblown because in reality, parties have strengthened as a result of the Internet. As with most debates, it is has become increasingly clear through the work of academics that the Internet's effect has neither revolutionized politics nor left it exactly where it used to be.

One of the most common ways to study political parties' use of the Internet is to examine their websites. "The external face of party use of ICTs is the Internet home page" (Nixon & Johansson, 1999, 142). In a study of both United States Senate candidates' and state party sites' use of the web in the 2004 elections, Cohen (2005) revealed four common goals of both party and candidate websites: 1) to mobilize existing supporters, 2) to get out the message, 3) to empower
existing supports, and 4) to solicit contributions. Furthermore, the study highlighted state parties’ role as a "pathway between constituents and government" as most important to the organization.

With a different outlook on website impact, Norris (2003) noted that given how the limited impact on participation in the U.S. was mirrored in the European countries she studied, she concluded, "...websites are likely to have greater impact on communication pluralism rather than by widening direct participation among disaffected groups" (Norris, 2003, 43). Again analyzing websites with a different goal in mind, Nixon & Johansson (1999) suggest that there is "...no great difference between political orientation and the amount of effort put into website design. There is, however, some slight evidence that left-of-centre parties are more ready to adopt ICTs as part of their communication strategy and to seek to gain a new audience from doing so" (143). Their study of Sweden and the Netherlands revealed that ICTs have helped make parties more effective, efficient, and flexible in their communication strategy. Nonetheless, websites in both countries revealed missed opportunities with regard to discursive democracy and true bottom-up information flow that reaches party leaders and policy makers. These findings, echoed by a number of researchers, suggest that despite the rapid growth of Internet use by parties, websites tend to maintain the uni-directional flow of information rather than allowing meaningful interactivity (Gibson et al, 2003; Rommele, 2003).

--- The Impact of the Internet on Political Parties ---

As mentioned previously, the party change literature reflects a long-term decline of party competition and the rise of catch-all party organizations. Recall that the catch-all organization arose as social class became less important in politics around the mid-twentieth century. With radical ideology falling out of favor with the public, catch-all organizations sought favorable
public opinion with a short-term outlook. Thus, as elections became less and less competitive, a convergence of ideology resulted, with both major political parties seeking to win over the electorate by shifting their ideology to fall in line with the voters. The median voter has become far more important to party organizations that aim to win over a majority. Moreover, cartel party emergence has tended to further reduce the levels of competition, as parties become quasi-agents of the state and work to ensure their ongoing survival (Katz & Mair, 1995).

What effect has the Internet had on competition levels between political parties in the United States? The rise of the Internet and new technologies, specifically with regard to politics, has produced an ongoing debate regarding the 'normalizing' effect on party competition. The normalization argument suggests that in cyberspace, offline dominance by major parties continues to hold true online (Margolis et al., 1999; Gibson et al., 2003). In other words, as web technology advances, the need for full-time highly skilled managers and professionals becomes important, furthering the gap between major and minor parties. Accordingly, many scholars that adhere to this belief argue that the Web has been used to perform existing functions more efficiently, rather than offering any radical innovations. As a result, information dissemination and resource generation remain more evident on party websites than any attempts to promote participation or interactivity, both within and outside of parties in the US and UK (Gibson et al., 2003).

On the other side of the debate, equalization of the communications playing field has tended to receive less scholarly support as a possible impact of the Internet; Margolis et al. (1999) have argued that equalization, or the ability of minor parties to seriously compete with major parties based on technological advances, is far less likely than normalization. Predictions for politics as usual have, however, faced a number of critics. Norris (2003) found that European
websites have given minor and fringe parties a greater voice while also providing both top-down and 'bottom-up' communication. Thus, expectations of a more balanced communications playing field have also cropped up with the rise of the Internet (Norris, 2003). In the United States, Goodhart has examined how both major political parties have utilized the Internet thus far. "The Republican organization was the first party to achieve widespread success in the 1970s with the most profitable partisan technology - direct mail - and has reaped the benefits ever since. Huge profits derived from Republican direct mail programs have enabled the party to dominate political fund-raising to the current day" (1999, 121). Examining the traditional proclivities, and consequently, the political culture of each party based on a survey of state party organizations, the study suggested that the Republican emphasis on direct mail technology instead of the Internet has benefited their fundraising abilities whereas the Democratic advantage in Internet usage better suited their strategy of voter outreach and recruitment. "The traditional campaign styles of the parties are strongly reflected in their approaches to technology. Indeed, each party's degree of interest and success with a particular technology may have more to do with the function and suitability of the technology relative to the party's overall strategic characteristics than any other factor" (Goodhart, 1999, 133).

With these arguments in mind, many of the trends in Internet usage between cultures have lead to the conclusion that parties, not the external environment, tend to drive Internet usage and adaptation. Thus, "cyberspace is clearly not jolting traditional political actors into radically different styles of message delivery, nor is it leading to a more egalitarian world of political communication" (Gibson et al., 2003, 67). Other scholars disagree, suggesting instead, that technology inevitably drives economics and politics, not the other way around (Bimber, 2003). Overall, it is clear that the verdict is not yet in on the impact that the Internet will have on
either politics or political parties. Debates concerning the wide array of topics that can be linked to the Internet continue, as the vast amount of research in the area tends to produce conflicting results. One interpretation suggests,

The Internet is not, as yet, capable of producing fundamental change to party systems, certainly not on its own...Internet-based technology might have a greater impact internally within parties since...the political use of the Internet appeals more to those who are already active...As a result, some have seen the use of ICTs as a means of reinvigorating parties or reengaging with party grassroots whilst others have seen increased application of ICTs as bringing further radical changes to the character of political parties and style of internal democracy. (Ward et al., 2003, 26 - 27)

The Internet has undoubtedly influenced political parties. Revolutionary? Probably not. Politics as usual? Not necessarily. Rather, it seems that the Internet has had the biggest influence on administrative and communications modernization (Nixon et al., 2003). Parties have been forced to transform themselves in order to re-create the ways in which they communicate with the public. "The Internet may eventually help alter the style of party politics but have a less radical effect on party competition. The net gain for parties is that it provides a flexible and sophisticated communication channel with the public"(Nixon et al., 2003, 242). Neither the "saviour nor executioner" of political parties, technology will play a key role in political organizations’ relationship with the public.
PART TWO:
DATA AND
METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER THREE
VARIABLES AND DATA SETS

In order to examine the impact of the Internet on state political parties, I created two data sets, each with a different focus in mind. The first data set, a survey of state party officials, was aimed at understanding how political parties are adapting to new ICTs, by providing an insider’s take on a wide array of issues. In other words, do political insiders see the Internet as driving their parties? And, if so, in what ways has the Internet transformed party operations? Moreover, by questioning party insiders, I sought out evidence of a reciprocal relationship between the Internet and state party organizations. Thus, I am interested in both how the Internet is driving political parties to change and how political parties have manipulated Internet usage to their advantage.

With these questions in mind, however, it became clear that a second data set was needed to provide a more complete analysis of Internet usage. With an insider’s take often varying from an outsider’s, the second data set I created sought to provide a clearer analysis of Internet use by state political parties from the viewpoint of the electorate. Through systematic analysis of all 100 state political party websites, I created a more complete data set, which focused on what often acts as the face of the organization to many members of the public, the webpage.

**-- Survey of State Party Insiders--**

Primarily based on the works of Goodhart (1999), Gibson *et al.* (2003), and Margolis *et al.* (2003), I developed a survey questionnaire that focused on party Internet use at the state level. With the help of Professor Robert Friedrich at Franklin & Marshall College and Professor
Rachel Gibson at Australian National University, the survey topics I hoped to examine were molded into questions ranging from the importance of the Internet to issues such as fundraising and internal party communication to estimates of email list size and national control over state Internet usage. Using the theoretical background of models of party organization, party culture and organizational strength at the state level, the survey focused on topics relating to the network model of party organization, party differences in Internet usage, and the potential democratizing impact of party websites in relation to the electorate. For the complete questionnaire, please see Appendix A.

Once the survey questionnaire was completed, I placed it online at the server of Franklin & Marshall College's Center for Opinion Research. I chose to use executive directors at all 100 state party organizations as my population based on a number of factors. First, the availability of specific staff members is limited, executive directors, unlike IT directors or web communications staff, exist at most state parties with the same job title and similar duties. Second, the busy nature of politics brings with it a lack of time for many high-ranking party officials, such as state party chairs, thus limiting the likelihood of their participation. Third and finally, I was looking for a staff member with broad knowledge of not only Internet usage at the state level, but of political issues as well. These factors, taken in combination with the advice of another party scholar, David A. Dulio, led to my decision to seek participation from state party executive directors.

At this point in the process, executive directors at all 100 party organizations were contacted in order to ask for their participation. Five contacts, in the form of letters and postcards, were made from December 5, 2005 through February 5, 2006. After February 5th, Franklin & Marshall College's Center for Opinion Research began contacting state party staff via telephone. Due to low participation numbers, if the executive director was unable to complete the survey, staff at
the Center for Opinion Research requested that another staff member access the survey online. The final deadline for completion of the survey was March 10, 2006. Details regarding the results of the survey will be discussed later.

---Website Content Analysis---

What purpose do party websites serve? How do they compare across regions, political cultures, and political parties? Moreover, how do party websites fall into the theoretical frameworks mentioned above regarding issues such as political participation levels, democratization, and interactivity? Using a website content analysis coding schema that was based on the works of Cunha et al. (2003), Gibson & Ward (2003), and Gibson et al. (2003), my second data set focused on these questions. The coding schema addresses a range of topics such as transparency (information provision), interactivity, internal and external networking, and participation. For the complete coding schema, see Appendix B.

The content analysis data was collected over a one month time period from February 6, 2006 to March 6, 2006. Each website took approximately 15 minutes to score; the time period of one month was used to minimize variability based on changes that occur on party websites on a regular basis. To determine intercoder reliability, a second person coded ten random party websites from March 23, 2006 to April 9, 2006. Then, the scores for each category (banner symbolism, transparency/information provision, etc.) were compared across all ten websites, producing a Spearman's correlation of 0.912. Given the variations in time period and the lack of training for the second coder, the intercoder reliability score demonstrates the validity of the coding schema. Specific results of the content analysis will be discussed in detail later.

---Independent Variables---

The independent variables that I developed were used in an attempt to identify social and
political factors that influence the way the Internet is used by political parties at the state level. With previous analysis of Internet use and political parties tending to focus on the national level (Margolis et al., 1999; Gibson & Ward, 1997), this study sought to provide an up-to-date look at state party Internet usage in the United States. The number of social and political factors that could potentially influence Internet usage by both the public and political party organizations are numerous. Based on previous work in the field and the literature, I decided to focus on the following independent variables:

- party competition
- state population (size)
- state per capita personal income
- state political culture
- state household Internet access levels
- state percentage of the population voting
- region

* Party Competition *

Interparty competition has been a primary focus of scholars studying state party politics. Key (1964) first contended that competitive states would result in stronger political parties and the debate over the influence of party competition on state party organizations has continued to today. Other scholars have found a minimal correlation between levels of competition and party strength; more revealing, however, was the link between bureaucratic organization and party strength. With party strength as a key to electoral success (Cotter et al., 1984), the implications for party competition continued to be researched. Differences in party strength, as noted in literature on party culture at the state level have been echoed more recently; Jewell & Morehouse (2001) state, “The typical Republican Party is stronger, more professional, and better funded than its Democratic counterpart. The Democratic Party is reputed to relish diversity, dissent, and fractiousness”(95). Nonetheless, as with many of the debates that continue within politics, a
consensus has not yet developed. Party competition literature tends to suggest that the influence is predominantly on organizational strength. It remains unclear in what ways party competition influences other aspects of party organizations.

What exactly does party competition look like at the state level? According to Bibby (2002), “Across the country, it is now possible for either party to win statewide elections” (27). In order to test this declarative, I updated the Ranney Index, a measure of interparty competition at the state level that Austin Ranney adapted from the work of Richard Dawson and James Robinson. According to Ranney (1976), the Dawson-Robinson measure yielded an “index of interparty competition” and included three basic components:

1) proportion of success – as measured by the percentage of votes won by each party for statewide offices and the percentage of seats in the legislature held by each party
2) duration of success – as measured by the length of time each party has controlled the statewide offices and/or legislature
3) frequency of divided control – as measured by the proportion of time in which control of the governorship and legislature has been divided between the parties.

Ranney outlined his variable as follows:

... I have examined only state offices; and I have chosen the governors and state legislators because they are the states' most powerful elected officers... For each state I first tabulated the percentages of the two-party popular vote for governor received by each party in each election, and the percentages of seats in each house of the legislature held by each party in each legislative session... From these tables I computed four basic figures: (1) the average percentage of the popular vote won by Democratic gubernatorial candidates; (2) the average percentage of the seats in the state senate held by the Democrats; (3) the average percentage of the seats in the state house of representatives held by the Democrats; and (4) the percentage of all terms for governor, senate, and house in which the Democrats had control. Finally, for each state I then averaged together all four percentages. The result, carried to four decimal places, is the state's 'index of interparty competition.' (468)

Using this procedure, I created an “index of interparty competition” for the period from 1994 to 2004. This updated competition variable allows for categorization of each state, as
Ranney suggests, in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Party Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.8500 or higher</td>
<td>one-party Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.6500 to .8499</td>
<td>modified one-party Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.3500 to .6499</td>
<td>two-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1500 to .3499</td>
<td>modified one-party Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.0000 to .1499</td>
<td>one-party Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of states among these categories is given in Table 2. As is shown, classification of the most recent past leaves no states that qualify as one-party Democratic or one-party Republican. This demonstrates an apparent shift in party competition from the time of Ranney's classification (1962-1973), which included seven one-party Democratic states and the same number, zero, one-party Republican states. This shift, as Aldrich (2000) and Jewell & Morehouse (2001) recognize, is strongly linked to changes in party alignments and competition in the southern states in the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout this time, many long-time Democratic strongholds began to shift toward balance, thus becoming much more competitive states.
Table 2. *Classification of the Fifty States According to an Index of Interparty Competition, 1994-2004 (Developed by Austin Ranney, 1976)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modified one-party Democratic</th>
<th>Two-party</th>
<th>Modified one-party Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Hawaii (.7620)</td>
<td>- New Mexico (.6443)</td>
<td>- Nevada (.4545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- West Virginia (.7506)</td>
<td>- Georgia (.6442)</td>
<td>- Delaware (.5462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arkansas (.7387)</td>
<td>- California (.6395)</td>
<td>- Maine (.5453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maryland (.7223)</td>
<td>- North Carolina (.6284)</td>
<td>- Washington (.5418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rhode Island (.7117)</td>
<td>- Oklahoma (.6153)</td>
<td>- Minnesota (.5091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Massachusetts (.7063)</td>
<td>- Tennessee (.6075)</td>
<td>- Nebraska (.4900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alabama (.6880)</td>
<td>- Kentucky (.5836)</td>
<td>- Virginia (.4884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lousiana (.6797)</td>
<td>- Missourri (.5722)</td>
<td>- Illinois (.4761)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mississippi (.6686)</td>
<td>- Connecticut (.5663)</td>
<td>- South Carolina (.4755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Texas (2496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- New York (.4611)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unicameral state legislature; Index based on gubernatorial data only.

The above index also reflects a change in the number of two-party states, which has shifted from twenty-three to thirty-two over the past four decades, thus demonstrating an increase in party competition at the state level. The implication on state party organizations, based on the potential link between levels of party competition and organizational strength, is for equalization between both major parties. This question, however, should be examined in detail in later research, as emphasis on Internet usage will not allow such determinations.

Using Ranney's categorization results in a large number of two-party states; which,
moreover, have a high degree of variability amongst them as scores range widely from .3500 to .6499. If the categorizations are transformed, however, a much more equally distributed representation of party competition is possible. Thus, I have included a second distribution of party competition (see Table 3) based on the following categorization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score Range</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.7000 or higher</td>
<td>one-party Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.6000 to .6999</td>
<td>modified one-party Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.4000 to .5999</td>
<td>two-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.3000 to .3999</td>
<td>modified one-party Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.0000 to .2999</td>
<td>one-party Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Revised Classification of the Fifty States According to an Index of Interparty Competition, 1994-2004 (Developed by Austin Ranney, 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-party Democratic</th>
<th>Modified one-party Democratic</th>
<th>Two-party</th>
<th>Modified one-party Republican</th>
<th>One-party Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii (.7620)</td>
<td>Alabama (.6880)</td>
<td>Kentucky  (.5836)</td>
<td>Virginia (.4884)</td>
<td>Florida (.3822)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Louisiana (.6797)</td>
<td>Missouri  (.5722)</td>
<td>Illinois (.4761)</td>
<td>New Jersey (.3790)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mississippi (.6688)</td>
<td>Connecticut (.5663)</td>
<td>South Carolina (.4755)</td>
<td>Pennsylvania (.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Mexico (.6433)</td>
<td>Vermont   (.5647)</td>
<td>Texas (.4696)</td>
<td>New Hampshire (.3703)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia (.6442)</td>
<td>Delaware  (.5462)</td>
<td>New York (.4611)</td>
<td>New Mexico (.3641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>California (.6305)</td>
<td>Maine     (.5453)</td>
<td>Nevada (.4545)</td>
<td>Arizona (.3346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Carolina (.6284)</td>
<td>Washington (.5418)</td>
<td>Indiana (.4534)</td>
<td>Ohio (.3231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oklahoma (.6153)</td>
<td>Minnesota (.5091)</td>
<td>Oregon (.4242)</td>
<td>Arizona (.3049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tennessee (.6075)</td>
<td>Nebraska  (.4900)</td>
<td>Iowa (.4129)</td>
<td>South Dakota (.2912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wisconsin (.4012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unicameral state legislature, Index based on gubernatorial data only.
* State Population (Size) *

A second variable that I found to be a potential influence on Internet use by political parties at the state level is the population of the state. Logically, a smaller population, by the sheer nature of size alone, may impact party organizations by providing less incentive to reach constituents via the Internet, whereas states with large populations can use the Internet to reach far more people in a more efficient manner. The categorization of each state based on population statistics from Census 2000 can be found in Table 4.

Table 4. *State Population by Category in Ascending Order (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;1 Million People</th>
<th>1-2.9 Million People</th>
<th>3-4.9 Million People</th>
<th>5-6.9 Million People</th>
<th>7-10 Million People</th>
<th>&gt;10 Million People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
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<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Idaho</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Texas</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
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<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>New Mexico</td>
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</table>

* State Per Capita Personal Income *

Similarly, personal income was a third variable that had the potential to impact Internet usage. As mentioned previously, Internet users tend to be of higher socioeconomic background than non-Internet users. Given this, per capita personal income in a state could correlate with
Internet use by the electorate, thus impacting how state parties are using the Internet to reach their voters. Classifications of state per capita personal income are provided in Table 5.

Table 5. *State Per Capita Personal Income by Category in Ascending Order, 2002 (CQ, 2004)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$20 - $24,999</th>
<th>$25 - $29,999</th>
<th>$30 - $35,000</th>
<th>&gt; $35,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>Michigan</td>
<td>California</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
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<td>Utah</td>
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</table>

*State Political Culture*

Daniel Elazar has defined political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (1966, 79). For Elazar, political culture is instrumental in three main areas: 1) influencing perceptions of politics by the electorate and expectations of the government; 2) determining the type of people that become active in government; and 3) the way in which government is practiced by citizens, politicians, and public officials. He defines three central political cultures, each reflecting different notions of politics and government.

The individualistic (I) political culture "emphasizes the conception of the democratic order as a marketplace" (Elazar, 1966, 86). Rising out of the business cultures in New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore, this culture stresses government as a necessity for predominantly utilitarian reasons and one that needs not concern itself with “good society.” Instead, the will of the people matters most with private concerns limiting government intervention. Moreover, at the time of Elazar’s work, government activity in an individualistic state focused on economic matters and a laissez faire attitude existed. As time has passed, scholars contend that these classifications of culture must be considered dynamically. With emphasis remaining on private economics, shifts over time have led to an expansion of government’s role into areas such as the economy and utilities. Lastly, the individualistic political culture is also associated with limited political participation, as “politics is viewed as just another means by which individuals may improve their economic and social position”(Saffell, 1987).

The moralistic (M) political culture “emphasizes the commonwealth conception as the basis for democratic government. Politics, to the M political culture, is considered one of the great activities of man in his search for the good society”(Elazar, 1966, 90). Thus, politics is a public activity and individualism is limited by a commitment to the community as a whole. Further, “political participation is regarded as the duty of each citizen in a political setting where government seeks to promote the public welfare of all persons”(Saffell, 1987). Lastly, moralistic cultures are committed to government intervention because government is seen as having a positive influence.

The traditionalistic (T) political culture “is rooted in an ambivalent attitude toward the marketplace coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth”(Elazar, 1966, 92). Reflecting an acceptability of hierarchical society and seeking an ordered nature, the T culture accepts the positive role of government while attempting to limit its power in order to secure the existing social order. Often antibureaucratic, traditionalistic cultures believe family
ties and rights are important and any professional bureaucracy could interfere with the status quo. (See Table 6 for categorization of each state according to state political culture)

Table 6. Political Culture by State (Elazar, 1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualistic</th>
<th>Moralistic</th>
<th>Traditionalistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* State Household Internet Access Levels *

Household Internet access levels vary widely among U.S. states with some states below 40% and others above 60%. Could the percentage of a state population with Internet access impact the way state political parties use the Internet? To examine this question, I classified states according to household Internet access levels (see Table 7).

* State Percentage of the Population Voting *

Another variable I considered was voter turnout. Using data on the percentage of each state population that voted in November 2002, participation levels vary from below 30% to above 60%. Once again, the data allowed for categorization (see Table 8). For many of the variables mentioned thus far, categorization served as a simple means to interpreting and reading the results. Nonetheless, the numerical values for each factor, if available, also served as independent variables.
Table 7. State Household Internet Access Categorizations by Percent (CQ, 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt; 45%</th>
<th>45% - 46.9%</th>
<th>47% - 48.9%</th>
<th>49% - 51.9%</th>
<th>52% - 55%</th>
<th>&gt; 55%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Virginia</td>
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</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt; 30%</th>
<th>30% - 34.9%</th>
<th>35% - 39.9%</th>
<th>40% - 44.9%</th>
<th>45% - 59%</th>
<th>&gt; 50%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
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<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Region *

Region, like all of the above factors, has the potential to shed light on why variations in Internet usage by state parties exist. Moreover, regional effects can often be closely tied to state political culture. Regional categorizations can be found in Table 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>Midwest</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
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<td>Maine</td>
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PART THREE:
RESULTS
CHAPTER FOUR:  
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The survey was completed by 51 state party staff members, which represented 38 states. Within that number, 25 were Democratic organizations and 26 were Republican. Among the website content analysis, only one state party website was not working properly during testing. Thus, the content analysis data set was made up of 99 of the 100 state party organizations.

In analyzing the results, I have chosen to focus on five major areas, each incorporating both data sets. First, what do these data tell us regarding party differences in Internet usage at the state level? In other words, does party culture influence Internet usage and, if so, in what ways? Second, what role do weblogs, or “blogs,” play in politics at the state level? Are blogs actively contributing to a wave of interactivity on the web? Third, what other interesting details do the data shed light upon? Specifically, how do region, state culture, or income influence state-level Internet usage by political parties? Fourth, concerning competition: Do competitive states produce more active and adept parties with regard to Internet usage? And finally, what theoretical implications regarding models of party organization can be made based on the data? That is, is there an appropriate model of party organization in which the Internet fits?

--- Party Differences in Internet Usage? ---

Based on the works of Freeman (1986) and Klinker (1994a,b), party differences in Internet usage seem to be a forgone conclusion. Nonetheless, these works tend to emphasize party culture at the national level rather than in the states. Moreover, the impact of the Internet on these cultures, if it exists at all, has not been studied in any detail, leaving open the possibility
of a new culture based on Internet usage.

* Impersonal Recruitment *

As mentioned previously, the culture of the Democratic Party is one in which power flows upward from the bottom whereas, in the Republican Party, power flows down from the top. In other words, in the Democratic Party, power begins with the people and works upward to leaders whereas the hierarchical nature of the Republican Party lends itself to power that begins with leaders and works its way down to the people. Coupled with a Republican business mentality, this in turn, leads to a Republican culture that lends itself to placing higher importance on impersonal recruitment (Freeman, 1986). Thus, I hypothesized that the Republicans would value the Internet more highly as a tool for impersonal recruitment in the forms of fundraising and member recruitment because the Internet is inherently impersonal, with no face to face contact and very limited interactivity.

Perhaps most interesting and revealing in examining the results of the survey was the minimal amount of any significant party differences that were anticipated based on culture. More specifically, questions that were posed regarding the level of importance of the Internet to both member recruitment and fundraising did not reveal significant party differences. While the frequencies of responses tend to suggest that Democrats value the Internet more highly for both member recruitment and fundraising, this pattern is not a significant relationship.

This lack of significance could imply two things. First, assumptions about party culture could be out of date or not indicative of politics at the state level. Or second, and more likely, in my opinion, is that the Internet itself is not valued highly as a tool for these functions of state parties but the functions themselves are still valued. By asking about the value of the Internet to these areas of work, this series of questioning does not allow for implications regarding the
broader value of each function to the party regardless of the role of the Internet. In other words, the Republicans may still value impersonal recruitment more highly, but the Internet is not a key tool in that recruitment. This too explains the positive trend in the Democratic Party whereby the Internet is valued highly as a tool for these functions since these functions are not highly established and ingrained in the culture of the organization.

* National Control of State-Level Internet Usage *

National control over Internet usage at the state level became an interesting issue as I analyzed websites for all 100 party organizations. The content analysis schema included a question asking which company was powering the party's website. The decision to include this question was based primarily on quick scans of party websites before I began to analyze each site in depth, which led to the recognition of overwhelming similarities in Republican Party websites and very few similarities in Democratic sites. Once the data set was collected, I determined that of the 50 Republican Party websites, 18 sites had the exact same format and many of the others incorporated aspects of this "GOP template" into their webpages. Based on examination of these 18 sites, the format appears to be provided by the Republican National Committee, this conclusion, however, could not be confirmed because the sites do not explicitly state that they are powered by the GOP. Figures 1-3 are examples of Republican Party websites. The first two sites both adhere to the template, as they are identical in format. The third Republican site appears to use the format because it includes some features of the Republican template, however the site generally looks different from the previous two.
Figure 1. Nevada Republican Party website (2-27-06), an example of the GOP template.

Figure 2. Republican Party of New Mexico site (3-1-06), another example of the GOP template.
Figure 3. Arizona Republican Party website (2-6-06) including a few GOP template features.

On the Democratic side, a private company, Orchid for Change, provides the most similar thing to the GOP template. This organization seeks to link together a network of progressive sites and thus far, there are ten state party organizations that utilize their services. These pages also adhere to a similar style and format. As is clear however, the number of Democratic parties using this company is smaller than the number of Republican parties that use either the exact GOP template or aspects of it, as virtually every Republican site includes a GOP newsfeed. Regardless of frequency, the varying types of organizations powering the sites are revealing in and of themselves. If, as is assumed, the Republican sites are powered by their national organization, then their websites fall in line with a party culture that is top-down and hierarchical. Moreover, the fact that the most similar comparison on the Democratic side comes
from a private company is also revealing. The long history of Republican organizational dominance at the state level may continue to be echoed in party websites as the Democrats do not depict similarities in style and format, and when they do, it is based on the work of a private company, not the national organization (see Figures 4-6 for examples).

Figure 4. Iowa Democratic Party website (2-19-06), powered by Orchid for Change.
Figure 5. Democratic Party of New Mexico website (3-1-06); powered by Orchid for Change.

Figure 6. Arizona Democratic Party website (2-6-06); an independent website.
To examine this question of national party control, I used a chi-square ($\chi^2$) test of independence. The chi-square test allowed me to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two parties in terms of those survey respondents that suggested their national party had any control over Internet use at the state level and those who stated that the national party had no control at all over state Internet usage ($\chi^2 = 4.410, df = 1, p < .05, \Phi = -.303$). The distribution of responses can be seen in Table 10. Evidently, there is a weak to moderate relationship between response types. In other words, the likelihood that more Republican Party insiders perceive the national party as exerting some degree of influence over state-level Internet usage and more Democratic Party insiders perceive the national party as exerting no influence at all over state-level Internet usage exists at a weak to moderate degree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Control</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Control</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Organizational Strength *

One predictor of organizational strength that I examined was party email list size. Scholars often note that there is a Republican advantage in organizational strength at the state level based on factors such as fundraising abilities, staff size, budget size, etc. As a measure of organizational strength, survey respondents were asked for their party's email list size from both last year and this year. As Table 11 depicts, the mean email list sizes continue to differ based on party affiliation but these differences were not significant in the old list ($t(35) = -0.684, n.s., two$
tailed) or the current list ($t_{38} = -0.795$, n.s., two-tailed). Based on this, it appears possible that the Democratic Party is closing the gap with regard to organizational strength at the state level.

Studied most recently by Aldrich (2000), state organizational strength continues to be associated with the level of competition in any given state. Consequently, taking these recent email list size numbers in combination with Democratic National Committee Chair Howard Dean’s plan to strengthen Democratic state organizations, leaves the door open for the Democratic Party to close the gap on Republican organizational dominance, if only in a minor way. As the DNC is now committed to training new staff members for state parties and funding their employment at the state level without dictating their roles, party cultures are again confirmed. With a Republican apparatus that rotates employees between state and national jobs in a highly hierarchical manner and a Democratic apparatus that trains employees but leaves duties at the state party’s discretion, the variations in party culture, of top-down versus bottom-up, are apparent. Nonetheless, this single measure of organizational strength is by no means sufficient to make broad claims about the direction of organizational strength and future studies should examine the way in which the Internet may be helping to close this gap, if the gap is closing at all.

Table 11. Mean email list size according to party and year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Year Ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20,195,0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31,659,7059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31,561,7619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50,406,0526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
--- State Parties' Relationship With Blogs ---

Weblogs, i.e. blogs, tend to be a hot topic in the media today with many major news organizations following blogs on a regular basis. Moreover, the interactive nature of blogs has given rise to further debate regarding the democratization of politics. Can the political process move toward direct democracy with active citizen input and minimal need for party organizations to serve as the link between the electorate and government? These questions seem to emphasize interactivity and inclusion as a key component to blogs. I wondered how important blogs were to state political parties and if they influence the organizations, whether through decision-making, feedback, or some other mechanism.

When asked if his/her state party organization regularly used any other form of Internet communication aside from email, a significant relationship with regard to party differences was evident ($\chi^2 = 4.694$, df=1, $p<.05$, Phi = .310). A higher frequency of Democratic respondents (13) suggested that their party regularly used any other form of communication than Republican respondents (6). I decided to examine this question in further detail. A follow-up question asked respondents to specify what other forms of communication are regularly used by your state organization. Again, there were significant differences between parties as Democratic survey participants replied "blog" in higher numbers (8) than their Republican counterparts (2). A chi-square test examining party and response specification of "blog" or no blog was significant ($\chi^2 = 4.777$, df=1, $p<.05$, Phi = .306). In other words, there is a weak to moderate relationship between party and blog specification as another form of communication that is regularly used, with Democratic respondents more likely to mention a blog. Thus, Democratic respondents were both more likely to regularly use another form of communication aside from email and to mention a weblog as a form of regularly used communication.
To provide a fuller analysis of these results, I incorporated my website content analysis data set into the survey data set and created a subset of state parties that both completed the survey and had their website analyzed. As a validation of the survey responses, this data set revealed a significant relationship between those parties that responded “blog” to the above question regarding other regularly used forms of communication and those websites that actually had a blog ($\chi^2 = 10.886$, df = 1, $p = .001$, Phi = .462). This moderate relationship suggests that a state party with a blog on their website was more likely to mention blogs as a regularly used form of communication. Moreover, to measure the influence of blogs on party organizations, I asked survey respondents if anyone at their party organization was responsible for regularly following blogs. As with the above question, those parties that have a blog on their website were more likely to regularly follow blogs than those who do not ($\chi^2 = 10.749$, df = 1, $p = .001$, Phi = .494).

Despite these differences, the story on blogs remains unclear. Questions in the survey regarding the extent that blogs influence decision-making did not reveal significant partisan differences or differences based on blog existence. In looking strictly at the website content analysis data set, a chi-square test allows me to again reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between party and blog existence as party differences in blog existence are evident ($\chi^2 = 12.190$, df = 1, $p < .001$, Phi = .349). The frequency of blogs according to party can be seen in Table 12. While many sites claim to have a blog, in reality, the interactivity of each blog can vary greatly. When classified according to who can post on the blog, as either “no blog”, “only insiders”, “only members”, or “anyone”, the party differences are again apparent ($\chi^2 = 14.565$, df = 1, $p < .005$, Kendall’s tau-c = -.327) (see Table 13 for frequencies).
Table 12. Frequency of Blog or No Blog on Websites According to Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blog</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Blog</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Frequency of Blog Type by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Blog</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Insiders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Party Members</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is clear in Tables 12 & 13, there appears to be a consensus within the Republican Party to avoid blogs whereas a division exists in the Democratic Party, with about half of the parties favoring blogs and half avoiding them. There are a number of potential reasons for this apparent uncertainty within the Democratic Party. First, perhaps there is an actual debate regarding blogs and the decision has not yet been made as to how to handle them. Second, perhaps the entire party would prefer blogs but the process of setting up and managing a blog has been delayed or impossible for some state organizations. And finally, perhaps there is some exogenous factor influencing the question of why some Democratic state parties have blogs and others do not. Based on the independent variables mentioned previously, I explored this question further but found there were very little distinctions to be made. Within the content analysis data set,
when sorted for Democrats only, I found that region, state culture, competition, income, internet access levels, population, and voter turnout had no significant effects on the existence of blogs.

Consequently, I am led to believe that either the party itself is unsure of what to do with blogs or those state organizations without blogs are in the process of getting them. Blogs, based on their inherent properties of interactivity, seem appropriate in a party culture that stresses inclusion and fairness. With the Democratic emphasis on the grassroots, the pattern of blog existence between parties is not surprising. However, the scarcity of blogs on the whole among state party organizations indicates a minimal impact of the Internet on interactivity and democratic practices. Despite the efforts of some scholars and politicians, it appears that the Internet has not yet lived up to its revolutionary potential with regard to citizen input and direct democracy as political parties have not welcomed such practices.

--- Other Influences ---

Thus far, the picture of the Internet transforming political parties seems uncertain. In what areas has the Internet had an impact? What factors play a role in determining how the Internet is used at the state level? Of all of the independent variables listed above, most had little or no influence on the way in which the Internet is used. Party differences were the most prevalent, and these too were not numerous. Of the few variables that had an influence, two were particularly noteworthy. First, when asked if the Internet has already changed the way in which state parties conduct business with the electorate, state income played a role in the responses. That is, in states with a per capita personal income below $31,000, all respondents that answered the question replied "yes" that the Internet has changed the way in which business is conducted with the electorate. In states with per capita personal incomes at or above $31,000, the picture was mixed. The relationship, however, was significant ($\chi^2 = 9.333$, df = 1, $p < .005$, $\Phi$
Consequently, these results suggest that in lower income states, the Internet, according to party insiders, has changed the way in which politics is done. Based on these data, however, I cannot draw conclusions as to how the Internet has changed the way business is done in these states. One could argue that the Internet has made it easier to reach constituents in these states and, moreover, since politics has generally continued to be an activity of higher income voters, state parties in lower income states may adhere to the revolutionary attitude mentioned previously, whereby the Internet is a tool for higher levels of participation and inclusion. Nonetheless, it is also true that far fewer people have readily available Internet access in lower income areas. If this is the case, one would expect higher income states to perceive the Internet as having changed politics and how it is done with the electorate, not lower income states.

Second, when participants were asked if their state organization contracted an outside company to conduct a majority of the party’s Internet activities, a chi-square test allowed me to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship with regard to state culture ($\chi^2 = 6.214$, df = 2, p < .05) (see Table 14). A Kendall’s tau-c measure of .399 suggests a moderately weak relationship. As is shown, however, the moralistic culture appears opposed to contracting outside companies, as nearly all of the respondents in this category replied “no.” Both the traditionalistic and individualistic cultures are somewhat divided. As you'll recall, the moralistic culture is one in which politics is “one of the great activities of man in his search for the good society.” The unwillingness of state parties to contract outside companies may reflect this culture as parties feel it is their obligation and duty to practice politics on their own.
Table 14. Frequency of Yes and No Responses Regarding Contracting an Outside Internet Company by State Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Party Competition: Does It Really Make a Difference? ---

Based on both the survey of state party insiders and website content analysis, party competition played little or no role in transforming the way in which the Internet is used by state party organizations. This conclusion, however, which is based primarily on statistics, and consequently, a lack of significant results may be misleading. Despite the lack of support for the role of party competition at the state level in this study, many other scholars have noted significant influences of party competition throughout the literature on state party organizations (Key, 1964; Ranney, 1976; Aldrich, 2000; Bibby, 2002). In my view, however, the results of this study do not contradict previous works on party competition, as much of the literature on party competition emphasizes organizational strength. Thus, other works may have established that party competition can be linked with organizational strength (i.e. highly competitive states produce stronger parties with regard to fundraising, staff size, budget, etc.) but with a lack of data regarding organizational strength in this study, the prior conclusion may still hold true. In other words, party competition does not seem to influence interactivity, transparency, networking, etc.. Nonetheless, these are not measures of organizational strength. With so little
research on the role of the Internet, it was previously unknown if any of the aforementioned independent variables dictated Internet usage by state parties. Consequently, these results, albeit lacking significance, still shed light on an underdeveloped field of political science.

--- A New Model of Party Organization? ---

In discussing the models of party organization previously, I separated the network model from the others. Where the mass, cadre, cartel, and other models have been studied in detail and solidified as a form of organization, the network model remains strictly theoretical with minimal scholarly consensus surrounding it. Defined as "any collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange" (Podolny & Page, 1998, 59), this model peaked my interest when considering it with regard to the Internet. In a time of fast-paced communication and predominantly web-based connections, the network model seemed fitting, not only to this study, but to any transformation of politics that has occurred with the rise of consultants, interest groups, PACs, and the Internet. In this model, "Party organization, can therefore, be likened to a network that includes regular party organizations as well as allied organizations, candidates' personal organizations, and individuals working to win elections" (Bibby, 1999, 76). Throughout this study, and in both the survey and website content analysis, I examined this question of the networking.

Party differences with regard to networking were immediately apparent. When asked to rank the importance of the Internet to internal party communication (between staff or elected officials), the comparison of party produced a significant chi-square ($\chi^2 = 9.963$, df = 4, $p < .05$, Kendall's tau-c = .059) suggesting that there is a weak relationship between the two factors. Based on frequencies, more Republican respondents replied "somewhat important" or
"important" than Democratic, thus, the Republicans may value the Internet more highly as a tool for internal party communication than the Democrats.

With regard to website content analysis, party differences were also evident. Internal networking scores for Republicans continued to rise in frequency as the scale increased from 0-4 whereas Democratic frequencies on internal networking scores failed to ever reach 4, the highest internal networking score. Evidently, the Republican party not only ranks the Internet more highly as a tool for internal party communication, they also score more highly on internal networking measurements with regard to their websites ($\chi^2 = 27.355$, df = 4, p = .000, Kendall's tau-c = .173). External networking, on the other hand, produces the opposite effect, as the frequencies depict higher scores on the Democratic side than the Republican side. Again, a chi-square test revealed a significant relationship between the variables ($\chi^2 = 13.551$, df = 5, p < .05, Kendall's tau-c = -.398). These results further confirm the culture of political parties at the state level. Internal networking is valued more highly and is more evident in the Republican Party, which operates in an elitist manner whereby party politicians are insiders in a circle of networking and communication; Democrats, on the other hand, produce higher evidence of external networking, fitting with a culture of inclusion and outside influence over party affairs.

Moreover, when analyzing my website content analysis measure of internal networking, I compared internal networking scores to the ranking of the importance of the Internet to internal party communication in a subset of data that included those parties which both completed the survey and had their website analyzed. The trend suggests that those respondents that answered "somewhat important" or "important" to the value of the Internet in internal party communication were more likely to have a higher internal networking score, as can be expected. The chi-square results suggest the relationship is significant ($\chi^2 = 27.235$, df = 16, p < .05, tau-b = .145).
Based on the results regarding networking, I believe that the network model deserves far more attention from scholars studying party organization. With the potential for so many influences, such as party culture, type of network (internal or external), and size of network, the possibilities of explaining party behavior at all levels are numerous. While networking is undoubtedly an activity of politics, can it explain the organization of politics? In my opinion, the rise of impersonal communication that the Internet has spearheaded verifies the need for further examination of this model. As many are aware, networking is the name of the game in politics; why hasn't it been studied at length as the organization of politics? Perhaps its biggest flaw as a model of party organization is accounting for citizen involvement. If political parties are organized as networks, with affiliated interest groups, consultants, and campaign operatives, where do voters fit in?
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

The Internet has changed politics but has it revolutionized it at the state level? The answer is no. With the Internet used as a tool to increase the speed of communication and news, there appear to be minimal differences at the state level from previous literature. The factors that play a role in how the Internet is used are limited. Party identification has the most influence; consequently, party culture seems to play the biggest role. This explanation, however, is used to describe a majority of the differences in politics all together. As parties have become increasingly polarized on the issues, their cultures remain different. While I would argue that a more recent analysis of party culture at the state level is desperately needed, it also seems unlikely that the party's cultures are merging. Much of the conclusions drawn from this study confirm the national party cultures as indicative of state level politics, despite the age of these two cultures, which have dominated the literature since the 1980s.

As mentioned previously, party competition, the other variable that tends to be studied most, was not a dominant influence by any means in this study. Nonetheless, these results may be misleading. Party competition has been shown to influence organizational strength. With this study, organizational strength was not the focus and it is likely that many of the survey questions and content analysis topics did not address this issue. Consequently, I would advocate for the development of new variables to measure organizational strength that take into account the Internet and its influence at the state level.

The Internet is clearly most important to communication. With 37 of the 51 respondents
citing communication of some form, internal or external, as the area to which the Internet is most important, communication has been transformed by the Internet and specifically, by email. What's more, 34 respondents suggested that the Internet has already changed the way business is conducted internally. The Internet has made communication faster, easier, and more numerous. As one survey respondent put it, “Internally, [the Internet] makes it easier to plan meetings or get talking points to people, but I don’t believe that the Internet has supplanted the ‘back room’ meeting.” Another suggested, “Email is almost strictly the form of communication. It's faster and more convenient.”

In this regard, as many other scholars have suggested, the Internet has not transformed politics on the whole; rather, it has sped up and made political parties more efficient at the practices that have always taken place. Generally, the areas of interest, such as democratization, interactivity, transparency, and accessibility may have received a boost with the help of the Internet, but they have not been placed at the top of the list. According to one insider, “The power of the Internet in politics is most relevant in the area of issues and news. I don’t think it wins elections, yet.” With many scholars continuing to hold on to the revolutionary capabilities of the Internet, I am left questioning the likelihood of such changes. While I believe it is too early to make a final verdict on the influence of the Internet, I also recognize the speed, or lack thereof, of changes with regard to interactivity, transparency, and other areas of potential transformation. The Internet has undoubtedly changed politics. It has made it faster and easier for citizens to remain engaged. But it has not revolutionized the game and changed the way parties work internally.

What about the reciprocal side of the issue? How have political parties influenced the Internet? With so few parties taking advantage of the availability of blogs and truly interactive
communication, the manipulation of the Internet to parties' advantages seem limited to fundraising and information distribution. As the aforementioned respondent noted, politics still takes place in a "back room". Thus, state parties are currently in an environment where a website is necessary so that they do not appear out-dated. Parties will continue to utilize the Internet to whatever degree they need to rather than to the degree that it transforms politics.
APPENDIX A  
- Survey Questionnaire -

The Internet and State Political Party Organizations

1. Please select the state in which you work.

2. What political party do you work for?
   Democrat
   Republican

3. Are you the Executive Director of your state party?
   Yes
   No

4. If not, please specify your position/job title at your state party.

5. In the following series, please consider how important the Internet is to the current work of your state party organization in each of the following areas.
   -- Assign each area a level of importance on a scale from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important). --

   For example: How important is the Internet to member recruitment within your state party?

   1- Unimportant
   2- Somewhat Unimportant
   3- Neutral
   4- Somewhat Important
   5- Important
   Don't Know/ Not Applicable

   MEMBER RECRUITMENT
   FUNDRAISING
   INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION (i.e. general information for the electorate such as policy positions, party history, etc.)
   FEEDBACK FROM MEMBERS (via chat rooms, discussion fora, email, blogs, etc.)
   COMMUNICATION TO MEMBERS (via email, message boards, etc.)
   TARGETED MESSAGING (narrowcasting)
INTERNAL PARTY COMMUNICATION (between staff or elected officials)
POLLING
NETWORKING (i.e. building connections and working relationships with non-party political operatives, interest groups, bloggers, consultants, etc.)
COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS
VOTER MOBILIZATION

6.
Please specify for which area from the above series the Internet is most important.

7.
Are there any areas or functions of your state party that require Internet use which have not been mentioned in the above series? If so, please specify. (Otherwise, please skip this question)

8.
*Roughly* how many members, including grassroots activists, do you currently have on your email list?

9.
*Roughly* how many did you have a year ago?

10.
How often does someone from your state party communicate with each of the following groups via email?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Bi-Weekly
- Monthly
- Semi-Annually
- Annually
- Less Than Once A Year
- Never
- Don't Know

Members And Other Grassroots Activists
Local Parties
Other State Parties
National Party
Non-party Political Operatives & Consultants

11.
Does your state party *regularly* use any form of Internet communication other than
email (e.g. blogs, chat rooms, etc.) to communicate with other party organizations?

Yes
No

12. If "yes", please specify what other forms of Internet communication are regularly used by your state party to communicate with other party organizations. (Otherwise, leave blank).

13. To what extent do you consider the national party in control of how the Internet is used by your party at the state level?

Fully
Partially
Not At All

14. Please select all of those online functions listed below that you believe are primarily under the control of the national party committee.

MEMBER RECRUITMENT

FUNDRAISING

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION (i.e. general information for the electorate such as policy positions, party history, etc.)

FEEDBACK FROM MEMBERS (via chat rooms, discussion fora, email, blogs, etc.)

COMMUNICATION TO MEMBERS (via email, message boards, etc.)

TARGETED MESSAGING (narrowcasting)

INTERNAL PARTY COMMUNICATION (between staff or elected officials)

POLLING

NETWORKING (i.e. building connections and working relationships with non-party political operatives, interest groups, bloggers, consultants, etc.)

COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS

VOTER MOBILIZATION

NONE OF THE ABOVE
15. How often does your state party use online voting to make internal decisions (regarding candidate selection, policy debate, etc.)?

Daily
Weekly
Bi-Weekly
Monthly
Semi-Annually
Annually
Less than once a year
Never
Don't Know

16. Please specify what types of internal decisions are made using online voting.

17. Of the following, what is the most common topic of internal dialogue that takes place through the Internet within your state party?

Policy
Procedure (i.e. rules and regulations)
Organizational issues (e.g. structure of the party)
Other
Don't Know

18. If "other", please specify or describe the most common type of internal dialogue that takes place through the Internet.

19. Roughly what percentage of your entire state party budget is allotted for Internet activities?

20. Of the total money allotted for Internet activities, roughly what percentage is provided for each of the following (total should add up to 100):

IT Personnel
Internet Software/Hardware
Design & Maintenance
Other

21.
Does your state party contract outside companies to conduct a majority of the organization's Internet activities?

Yes
No

22. Roughly what percentage of your state party's fundraising came via the Internet during the 2004 election cycle?

23. Roughly what percentage of your state party's fundraising do you expect to come via the Internet in the 2006 election cycle?

PAGEBREAK

24. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has taken any focus and/or money away from more conventional media operations at the state level?

Significantly
Moderately
Minimally
Not at all

25. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has taken any focus and/or money away from more traditional GOTV efforts at the state level?

Significantly
Moderately
Minimally
Not at all

26. Which of the following party activities do you think the Internet has had the most impact on?

Campaign Strategy & Tactics (e.g. fundraising, volunteer coordination, voter mobilization, etc.)
Internal Party Business (e.g. staff communication, policy debate, candidate selection, etc.)
Both areas equally

27. Is anyone in your state party responsible for regularly following the discussions on leading blogs?

Yes
No
Don't Know

28. To what extent do blogs influence the decision-making process within your state party?

Significantly
Moderately
Minimally
Not At All

29. Does your state party seek feedback from party members on the effectiveness of how you use the Internet?

Yes
No

30. If "yes", please select which avenue is the most commonly used method of receiving feedback. (Otherwise, skip this question).

Focus Groups
Online Opinion Polls
Offline Opinion Polls
Email
Other

31. Do you think that the Internet has made politics in your state more focused on individual candidates or on political parties?

More Focused On Candidates
More Focused On Parties
No Change

PAGEBREAK

32. Do you think that the Internet has strengthened or weakened your political party at the following levels?

Strengthened
No Change
Weakened

National Level
State Level
Local Level
33. Of the following, what effect do you think the Internet will most likely have on political parties generally?
(Please rank order the following potential effects of the Internet- 1 being the highest or most likely impact and 5 being the lowest or least likely impact to occur.)

Political Parties Supplanted; Direct Input From Citizens To Elected Officials
Reduced Role For Political Parties; Increased Activity From Citizens
Parties Thriving; Increased Participation Of Citizens; Internet Recruits More Members
Internet Makes Parties More Efficient In Their Current Practices; Limited Impact on Citizen Participation
Little Or No Impact; Politics As Usual

34. Do you think that the Internet has already changed the way that state political parties in the United States conduct business with the electorate?

Yes
No

35. Please explain your answer to the previous question.

36. Do you think that the Internet has already changed the way that state political parties in the United States conduct business internally (among party elites)?

Yes
No

37. Please explain your answer to the previous question.

PAGEBREAK

38. Are you willing to participate in a follow-up interview?

Yes
No

39. If yes, please enter your name, telephone number, and email address.

40. If you have any further comments, please enter them below.
The End. Your participation is **sincerely** appreciated.

**PAGEBREAK**

Thank you for your time.
APPENDIX B
- Website Content Analysis Coding Schema -

State Parties & The Internet – Website Content Analysis

Schema adapted from: Gibson & Ward (2003), Cunha et al. (2003), & Gibson et al. (2003)

Date __________________

State _____________________

Party _____________________

Website Address _____________________________________________

- Homepage Banner Symbolism –
1 pt. for each item present (0-7)
** Items considered separately (i.e. having an American flag does automatically imply stars, red, white, and blue; each item must exist on its own)**

___ * American Flag
___ * Stars
    ___ * Red
___ * White
___ * Blue
___ * Party Symbol (donkey/elephant)
___ * Photographs

- Transparency/Information Provision -
Additive index – 1 pt. assigned for each item present (0-16)

___ * Organizational History
    ___ * Structure
___ * Values/Ideology
___ * Policy Positions (i.e. platform)
___ * Documents (i.e. manifesto, constitution, by-laws)
___ * Newsletters/News stories
___ * Media Releases (i.e. speeches, statements, interview transcripts, etc.)
___ * People/Who’s Who (staff, leaders)
___ * Leader Focus (picture, text, bio)
___ * Candidate Profiles (not just links to candidate pages; profile/info. on the site)
* Electoral Information (statistics on past performance)
* Event Calendar (prospective or retrospective)
* Conference/Convention Information
* Frequently Asked Questions
* Privacy Policy
* Article Archive or Library

- Interactivity -
Each of the following can be assigned a value of 1 if present (range from 0-14)

* Information Gathering
  (site offers search engines, cookies, games/gimmicks, audio, video, etc. whereby the user can gather more information about the organization)

* Information Gathering (2)
  (more active engagement is available with users signing up for direct email updates and newsletters)

* Talking about Politics with Friends
  (site offers some kind of bulletin board or chat room for interested visitors to exchange views with one another)

* Trying to Influence Others' Opinions
  (site offers or encourages individuals to send some kind of email postcard or message to friends to attempt to get them to support the organization)

* Advertising
  (site offers downloads of wallpaper or screensavers which can be used to promote the organization publicly)

* Leafleting
  (site offers leaflets to download and print that can be distributed offline)

* Contacting
  (site offers email contact for itself and/or other individuals/organizations that encourage people to express opinions and provide feedback)

* Petitioning
  (site offers some kind of online petition to sign)

* Dialogue
  (site offers online chat Q&A sessions with leaders)

* Donating
  (person can donate financially to the organization from the site directly; not just a mailing address to send donations)

* Joining (associate)
  (organization offers associate membership or a "friends of" status directly on the site; i.e. person can join the organization or mailing/email list)

* Joining (full)
  (person can register to vote from the site; register in the party name)
* Campaigning/ Volunteer
  (a facility/form for volunteering/participating in campaigns on or offline is avail.)

* Membership Section
  (members-only pages are available that require an ID and password to enter)

- Blogs – (Interactivity)
  One pt. for each of the following (0-3):
  * Party has its own blog (not a news bulletin); only party officials/insiders
    can post on the blog (general public cannot)
  * Only party members and officials/insiders can post on the blog (must
    login)
  * Anyone in the general public can post on the blog

- Networking –
  Internal (Additive index: 0-4) One pt. for each type of link that exists.
  * National Party (i.e. DNC, RNC)
  * National Party Leader Home Page (i.e. Dean, Bush, Mehlman)
  * State Parties/ Officials (link to other state sites and/or state-level
    personnel (state reps., etc.)
  * Local Parties/ Officials (link to county organizations, local level political
    organizations)

External (Additive index: 0-5; 5 ordinal indices)
  * Partisan links - to organizations that are supportive of the party's goals
    (College Dems., Young Repub., etc.)
  * Reference links - to neutral or news/educational sites such as
    news broadcasters, newspapers, government sites, national libraries, etc.
  * Commercial links – to sites promoting business services such as
    booksellers, web designers, etc. (most common is web-designers; at bottom
    of page)
  * Blog links – to any blogs other than the official state party blog (if it
    exists).
  * Charitable links – (e.g. Red Cross, Katrina, etc.)

- Targeting –
  One pt. for the presence of a page(s) or links to pages aimed at: (0-5)
  * Geographically-Based Groups
  * Economic or Professional Groups (e.g. unions, doctors, lawyers, etc.)
  * Identity-Based Groups (e.g. women, lesbians, gays, etc.)
  * Young People
  * Issue-Based Groups

- Participation –
  Cumulative index – An ordinal index and two count (0-n)
Openness - (0-n)
   ____ * Count the number of email contacts to distinct units or branches within
   the party (i.e. webmaster, leaders, etc.) **People are considered separate units;
   state party officials only- don’t count county officials, or non-party indiv.*

Feedback Index – Ordinal (0-3)
   ____ * Email address on the site (1)
   ____ * Email address explicitly focused on soliciting comments (2)
   ____ * Online Form to submit views is offered (3)

Opinion Poll – (0-n)
   ____ * Count the number of opinion polls currently offered

- Presentation and Delivery -

Glitz Factor - Cumulative index (0-6) comprises two additive indices:
   Homepage design index – 1 pt. for each item present (0-3)
      ____ * Graphics
      ____ * Frames
      ____ * Moving/Flashin Icons
   Multimedia index – 1 pt. for each item present (0-3)
      ____ * Sound
      ____ * Video
      ____ * Live Streaming

Access - Two dimensions:
   Access in Principle – 1 pt. for each item present (0-7)
      ____ * No-frames option
      ____ * Text-only option (entire site)
      ____ * Text-only documents to download and print (clearly listed as such)
      ____ * WAP/PDA ‘wireless’ enabled
      ____ * RSS available (RSS syndication) **Usually available if party has a
            blog*
      ____ * Foreign language translation (e.g. Spanish)
      ____ * Software for the blind/visually impaired
   Access in Practice
      ____ * Size of home page in Kb (>25 slows site loading time
            significantly) **Look for the page on search site such as Google; size
            provided under the listing*

Navigability – Additive index – 1 pt. for each item present (0-n)
   ____ * Navigation Tips
- Count the number of search engines
- Home-page icon on lower-level of homepage
- Fixed menu bar on lower-level pages
- Site Map/Index

**Freshness - Ordinal Index (0-6)**

**Judged by news updates from the state, not the national organization**

Updated:

- (6) Daily
- (5) 1-2 Days
- (4) 3-7 Days
- (3) Every Two Weeks
- (2) Monthly
- (1) 1-6 Months
- (0) +6 Months
- (NA) Unknown/Not Available

- Noteworthy Features -
- Name of Company Powering the Website (*bottom of homepage*):

- Notes:
Works Cited


Annual Review of Political Science 6: 139-160.


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